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‘Fly Your Satellite!’ (FYS) is a recurring hands-on programme conducted by the ESA (European Space Agency) 
Academy Unit of ESA’s Education Office. Fly Your Satellite! was established to support university student teams in 
the development of their own CubeSats by enabling a transfer of knowledge and experience from ESA specialists to 
students. Selected teams are guided through project reviews and supervised through design consolidation and 
verification activities, conducted according to ESA professional practice and to standards tailored to fit the scope of 
university CubeSat projects. 
This paper focuses on key lessons learned and issues identified during the ongoing verification activities of the 
CubeSats in the second cycle of FYS (FYS2), and on how that experience is used to the benefit of participants of 
future cycles, including the teams in the third cycle (FYS3), who are now in the late stages of their Critical Design 
Review. Special attention is given to the lessons learned during the manufacturing, assembly, integration and testing 
phases as experience shows that first-time developers tend to underestimate the number of issues which arise when 
the design is translated from documentation and models into physical hardware. The lessons learned are categorised 
into the topics of Development, AIV, Project Management, and Product Assurance. 
In the Development category, the lessons learns suggest attention should be focused on emphasizing the importance 
of development models and FlatSats for early testing, proactive development of aspects which don’t appear to be 
immediately critical or appear to be on the project’s critical path (such as software and test GSE), and anticipating the 
need for compatibility with a range of possible orbit scenarios. 
The Assembly, Integration, and Verification category contains a large variety of lessons learned from the preparation 
for AIV activities, anomalies encountered, and reflection on what was done well in the programme. These lessons 
cover topics such as dimensional requirement non-conformances, electromagnetic interferences, and 
recommendations for system level testing preparation. 
Lessons learned for the Project Management category mostly arise from the understandable lack of (space) project 
management experience of the student teams, and the discussion focuses on possible mitigation approaches that can 
be implemented. Specific topics covered include delayed project schedules, management of student resources, risk 
management, and experiences with legal and regulatory requirements.  
The lessons learned on Product Assurance stem primarily from the difficulties in applying standard methodologies to 
educational small spacecraft projects. Problems with configuration control, clean room practices, and anomaly 
investigation methods are discussed, with recommendations for how student teams could solve such issues, primarily 
through the creation of additional documentation to track modifications and processes implemented
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INTRODUCTION TO FLY YOUR SATELLITE! 
‘Fly Your Satellite!’ (FYS) is a programme in the ESA 
Education Office dedicated to one, two, and three-unit 
CubeSats developed with educational scopes. The 
programme is open to university teams from ESA 
Member and Associate Member States1. 
Within FYS, university students are supported and 
mentored by ESA specialists with the purpose of 
ensuring that the satellites undergo thorough 
verification, increasing the chances for a successful 
mission. Students become acquainted with standard 
practices of the professional space sector by applying 
methodologies to their CubeSat project similar to those 
applied in larger ESA missions. FYS also offers access 
to state-of-art ESA test facilities, aiming at reducing the 
entry barrier for teams with less resources, as well as a 
launch opportunity for those achieving flight readiness.  
The missions undertaken by the university CubeSats are 
conceived by the students’ teams, and the development 
is funded by the universities and/or by their public or 
private sponsors. By participating in their CubeSat 
project, the students gain significant practical experience 
in the lifecycle of a real satellite project. 
As such, while largely addressing the engineering 
aspects, the programme also focuses on non-engineering 
topics that are to be covered in the undertaking of an 
actual space mission, such as frequency registration, 
space debris mitigation, and third party liability. 
FYS Programme Phases 
The ongoing second2 and third3 editions of ‘Fly Your 
Satellite!’ consist of five phases (Error! Reference 
source not found.) that closely resemble the 
development stages of a professional satellite project. At 
the end of each phase, the CubeSats are submitted to 
formal review processes, tailored from ECSS (European 
Cooperation in Space Standardization) standards. This 
provides the students with the experience of ESA 
reviews, thus providing them with valuable knowledge 
for a future career in the space industry. 
University teams that are successful in their application 
start the programme in the ‘Design Your Satellite!’ 
phase, already with a detailed design proposal that is then 
reviewed by ESA specialists, who identify key issues 
and assist in solving them in preparation for the Critical 
Design Review (CDR). During the CDR, the formal 
review panel and review board study every aspect of the 
project, including technical design, management (e.g., 
funding, schedule, project team, facilities), educational 
return, and legal & regulatory aspects, e.g., frequency 
notification to ITU (International Telecommunication 
Union), space debris mitigation. Those teams that are 
considered to have the detailed design at a mature level, 
and that have adequately dealt with the actions assigned 
are then accepted to enter the next phase. 
In the ‘Build Your Satellite!’ phase, the teams engage in 
procurement and manufacturing activities, followed by 
the assembly, integration and functional testing of their 
spacecraft. All the activities are performed following 
procedures carefully reviewed by ESA specialists.  
Following a Functional Test Review to establish that the 
team has developed a fully functional spacecraft and 
ground segment, successful teams are allowed to begin 
the ‘Test Your Satellite!’ phase, where the satellites are 
submitted to an environmental test campaign, using 
facilities and operator support that are provided by ESA. 
Many tests are conducted at ESA Education’s own 
CubeSat Support Facility (CSF) located at the ESEC, 
Galaxia site in Belgium. The campaign includes, at least, 
vibration testing and thermal vacuum/thermal cycling 
tests, with additional testing being performed where 
required. If the CubeSats have meet the success criteria 
in the environmental and functional tests, and the teams 
demonstrate that their ground and space segment meet 
all applicable requirements, they are awarded the access 
to the ‘Launch Your Satellite!’ phase following a Flight 
Acceptance Review (FAR).  
In preparation for the launch, the students actively 
support the safety approval process, assist in the 
installation of the spacecraft in the deployer and perform 
the necessary tests to ensure their system is ready to start 
Figure 1: Fly Your Satellite! Programme Phases 
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the operational mission. Before the launch, the students 
have the opportunity to participate in the launch 
readiness review, interfacing with the launch authorities 
where possible. 
The CubeSats are either launched and deployed to orbit 
directly from the launch vehicle upper stage, or launched 
as cargo to the International Space Station and deployed 
from there. The deployment to orbit initiates the last 
phase of FYS, called ‘Operate Your Satellite!’. In this 
phase, the teams utilise their own ground stations to 
receive telemetry and to control the spacecraft during the 
early operations as well as the operational part of the 
mission, which may last from 3 months up to multiple 
years. The orbit in which the satellites are deployed is 
selected to offer a suitable lifetime in compliance to the 
ESA space debris mitigation requirements. 
The participation in ‘Fly Your Satellite!’ concludes with 
an evaluation of the operational phase and a Lessons 
Learned workshop, where the path of the teams through 
the programme is put into perspective and improvements 
for both CubeSat projects and ESA are drawn. 
Phase D and AIV in Fly Your Satellite! 
In Fly Your Satellite!, almost all of the AIV activities are 
conducted in Phase D, during the Build and Test Your 
Satellite! programme phases. This differs from standard 
practice, where it is expected that AIV, and particularly 
qualification or TRL (Technology Readiness level) 
raising activities begin during Phase C or sooner. This 
difference stems from the need to ensure students’ teams 
get sufficient expert review of their baseline design in 
Phase C, before they spend their (often limited) budget 
on procurement of hardware to begin testing. While this 
approach is successful, there is also a large benefit to 
performing development tests early in the project, a topic 
discussed at length in this paper, and this approach may 
change during the preparation for future FYS 
programme cycles. 
Phase D encompasses all the manufacturing, assembly, 
integration, and verification activities needed to build 
and verify the CubeSat flight model, and concludes with 
the FAR, where teams are granted a launch opportunity 
if successful. The following major milestones are in the 
programme planning for phase D: 
1. Subsystem manufacturing and/or procurement 
from suppliers 
2. Subsystems qualification and verification: 
functional and performance testing, 
environmental tests 
3. CubeSat final assembly & integration 
4. Dimensional, physical, and external interfaces 
verification 
5. System functional test campaign: Full 
Functional, Mission (day-in-the-life) and End-
to-end tests in laboratory conditions 
6. System environmental test campaign: vibration, 
thermal vacuum/ thermal cycling / thermal 
balance tests, and other environmental tests as 
needed.  
INTRODUCTION TO THE LESSONS LEARNED 
The concurrent nature of the FYS programme, with 
teams in different cycles at different stages of their 
projects, fosters a unique context where lessons learned 
from one programme cycle can be applied to the others. 
This results in an overall enhancement of the educational 
value for the students, and of the quality of the different 
projects, as common issues are identified and addressed 
for all teams. Tapping into this experience, the FYS 
programme phases, milestones and educational 
opportunities have been reshaped accordingly 
throughout the various cycles. 
It should be noted that while some lessons learned and 
experiences may unique to student CubeSat or small 
satellite projects, it may be that many aspects can be seen 
in other projects with similar attributes e.g. limited 
budgets, small dynamic / changing teams, limited 
experience and many lessons learned are not unique to 
student teams. Furthermore the primary purpose of the 
FYS programme is the education of the students 
participating, and therefore it is expected that lessons 
learned and potential improvements are proactively 
investigated and discussed.  
Lessons learned are presented below, categorised into 
the topics of Development, AIV, Project Management, 
and Product Assurance. 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
The Need for Development Models and Prototypes  
From experience it has been seen that some teams 
underestimated the need to build and test a prototype or 
engineering model of their in-house developed units. 
Inexperience has led to considering that the definition of 
the design in a document, coupled with the result of 
extensive analysis was sufficient to close the design and 
directly manufacture the unit Flight Model (FM).  
The result of this approach was that often subsystem 
flight models were demoted to Development Models 
(DM) or Engineering Models (EM) following failure of 
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the subsystem verification campaign, for example when 
detecting out-of-spec performance.  
While not manufacturing DM/EM seems to fit well the 
low-cost profile of student projects, this can result in 
longer schedules and unforeseen costs: 
• The time to conduct complex analysis shall not 
be underestimated. For the development of 
certain subsystems it may be simpler to define 
or verify performances with a test, than to run 
and validate the analysis. This approach may be 
applied, for example, in the development of 
TT&C equipment or deployable mechanisms. 
• Not having sufficient budget to manufacture 
additional models can put the project in a 
difficult situation as human errors should be 
expected. This is especially common in an 
education environment, where the lack of 
experience of students in working with 
hardware results in unintentional damages to 
the units. The same philosophy on extra budget 
applies in cases of COTS (Commercial Off The 
Shelf) units’ damage or degradation. 
Software / Firmware Development Oversights 
A common theme seen in the FYS CubeSat projects is 
the issue of delayed software / firmware development for 
in-house subsystems and the main on-board software. 
This generally occurs because in early phases the student 
teams will have a heavy focus on the physical 
architecture of the system and the supporting analysis. It 
is often the case that the software development stays in a 
theoretical state until well into Phase D, and is even 
delayed to the last possible moment before it is required. 
The software development time is often underestimated 
and finds itself on the critical path of the project 
schedule. 
Beyond the issue of schedule revisions, if software 
becomes the limiting factor before the team can move to 
the testing that they would like to perform in Phase D, 
shortcuts in the development become a temptation. 
Initial software builds are rushed to completion and are 
unfinished, only providing the most basic functionality 
which allows the test results to be obtained, but only be 
conclusive at a hardware level. 
This approach can lead to more issues down the line. 
First, the rushed development process presents an 
increased risk of software bugs, some of which put test 
campaign results into question or delay the project 
further during the troubleshooting. Beyond this, 
however, is the fact that these initial software builds are 
created with the idea in mind that they will be changed, 
fixed, or expanded on when the time is available to do 
so. This means changes in the software configuration, 
which puts the validity of the tests performed using this 
software in question.  
FlatSats for Compatibility Checks and Software 
Development 
While AIV plans issued in Phase C allocate a short 
period in Phase D for verification using FlatSat models, 
it has been seen that teams often end-up relying heavily 
on this configuration for design and verification 
activities. A FlatSat serves the threefold purpose of 
confirming compatibility of interfaces, accelerating 
software development, and facilitating the definition of 
operational procedures.  
In particular, the FlatSat model turned out to be of 
special value for systems with a mix of in-house and 
COTS units to verify the data and power buses, and the 
software/firmware compatibility. This configuration also 
facilitates access to debug and programming connectors 
and the resolution of hardware issues on specific PCBs, 
before the CubeSat internal stack is integrated. 
Based on this experience, the programme 
recommendation to future participants will be to start 
FlatSat activities in earlier design phases and to plan 
them for longer durations. It should be noted that in this 
configuration, special protections shall be implemented 
to avoid the damage of expensive or difficult to replace 
flight/qualification models and sometimes the risk of 
damaging the unit outweighs the benefits of its 
integration in the FlatSat.  
Missing Analysis of Acceptable Orbit Ranges for 
CubeSat Missions 
Many student CubeSat projects do not have a 
consolidated mission analysis or understanding of which 
orbit ranges their mission can be compatible with. The 
approach of most teams is to assume a “baseline orbit” 
during the design stage. This often causes a problem as 
CubeSat missions often rely on rideshare or piggyback 
opportunities for launch. The possible orbit scenarios 
within the typical Sun Synchronous Orbits (SSO) or ISS-
related orbits still have enough variance that considering 
one “baseline orbit” is not enough to ensure 
compatibility with all scenarios. Factors such as altitude, 
eclipse fraction, and radiation doses can be significantly 
different between the ISS and SSO orbit options 
available. 
Changes in the launch opportunities are not uncommon, 
and can happen well into Phase D. If a comprehensive 
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understanding of compatibility with orbits is not 
prepared for the project, the team will need to repeat their 
analysis during Phase D to understand if they are 
compatible with new orbit options. There are two major 
risks here. The first risk is that students who performed 
previous analyses may have left the team, so there may 
be delays in repeating this analysis. The second risk is 
that due to lack of orbit compatibility assessment in the 
early stages, it may be that the baseline design is only 
viable for an unrealistically narrow range of orbits. This 
inevitably leads to design changes during Phase D, 
which can impact the schedule or cost budget, and can 
invalidate previous test results. 
Development of Melt Line retained Deployable 
Mechanisms 
Many student CubeSat teams elect to develop their own 
deployable antenna mechanisms, as it is a valuable 
educational experience to develop an in-house 
subsystem and it can reduce costs. A recurring lesson 
learned in the FYS programme is that the effort to move 
from a design concept to a prototype and then to a flight 
model is much larger than most student teams expect. 
The deployable mechanisms are typically spring loaded 
and retained using a tensioned melt line and deployed by 
means of a heating element to burn the line. This 
approach is used because of its heritage on past CubeSat 
missions, the fact that it uses cheap and easy to procure 
components, and that it is a simple mechanism, implying 
reliability. Because the deployment of the antennas is a 
mission critical functionality, the mechanism must be 
proven to be reliable through intensive testing. This is 
where teams in the FYS programme have encountered 
issues, but also where the experience and expertise of the 
FYS programme can add significant value to the 
projects. 
The setup of the melt line and heating element must be 
carefully implemented to ensure reliability. The 
tensioning of the melt line and the dissipation of heat 
from the heating elements are factors which must be well 
defined in the prototype stage. If the prototype does not 
implement these factors exactly as they will be 
implemented on the flight model, there can be 
significantly different performance of the mechanism. At 
high levels of tension in the melt lines, there can be some 
slip of the knots / crimps or stretch of the lines over time 
which reduces the tension, so some teams choose to 
pretension the lines to reduce this effect and increase 
reliability. The use of a melt line and heating element 
also proves to be sensitive to the environment it is placed 
in. During thermal vacuum testing, many teams discover 
that at cold temperatures they are unable to burn their 
melt lines and perform a successful deployment.  
The solution to these issues is to move the development 
of these deployment mechanisms to early stages of the 
project, allowing time for extensive testing and design 
iterations. Careful attention should be paid to having low 
variance in the burn times, as any variance will be 
amplified during TVAC testing. Characterisation of the 
heating element performance is crucial during anomaly 
investigations related to the deployment. 
Design for Testing  
In a perfect world, the entire development cycle of a 
project should be considered at the design stage, where 
performing modifications is still relatively easy and 
cheap, when compared to later stages of the project.   
Figure 2 reflects how in space projects, due to the 
uniqueness and elevated cost of the hardware, any late 
design change in the project can have a dramatic effect 
in terms of cost and schedule impact (e.g. missing the 
launch!).  
In the case of CubeSats, where resources are more 
limited than in larger projects, the accumulation of 
changes can quickly grow to become a showstopper. 
Figure 2 Impact of Late Changes in Space Projects 
The inflection point in the curve is the Assembly and 
Integration (AI) of the spacecraft, after which the 
spacecraft is placed under tight configuration control and 
any modification has to be carefully assessed in order to 
prevent invalidation of previous verification activities. 
From then on, it is natural that the more verification 
activities are performed, the lower the ease of change and 
the higher the cost of performing that change. 
The system-level environmental tests take place after 
Assembly and Integration, but also require a lot of 
previous preparation to be performed successfully. For 
instance, the TVAC test is an excellent example for this 
lesson learned. Test temperature sensors internal to the 
spacecraft which are essential to the TVAC test must be 
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attached during assembly and integration, and clearances 
for the cables to exit the spacecraft must be foreseen 
already at the design stage. The same goes for interfaces 
with the TVAC chamber or ground support equipment, 
umbilical connectors, and other capabilities required 
during thermal vacuum testing.  
If the test interfaces are not adequately considered from 
an early point, by the time of the environmental testing 
teams will find themselves having to perform last minute 
modifications to the design, and often partial reassembly 
of the system. This will be costly in terms of schedule, at 
a time when the launch opportunity is probably already 
on the horizon. 
 
ASSEMBLY, INTEGRATION & VERIFICATION  
CubeSat Dimensional Non-Compliances 
Spacecraft dimensional requirement violations, due to 
protruding components on the side faces or out-of-spec 
structures, are often uncovered during verification at the 
assembly and integration stage. By violating 
dimensional requirements put into place by standards4,5, 
CubeSat teams are reducing compatibility with the 
CubeSat deployers available on the market and thus 
limiting potential launch opportunities.  
It has been seen in the FYS programme that these non-
compliances are not noticed until the procurement of 
satellite hardware is well underway, and often not until 
the system stack is assembled and measured. Many 
violations found were due to parts mounted on the 
surface of the side panels protruding past the allowable 
limits. CubeSat width and height variations were also 
observed depending on the assembly and fastener 
tightening procedure. 
Additionally, interferences between components of the 
internal PCB stack were common. They do not formally 
impact acceptance of the CubeSat for integration of the 
deployer, but they certainly prevent the correct mating of 
equipment.  
There is not just one reason why this problem recurs, in 
fact there are several potential sources to this problem. 
The first reason for this is a lack of detail in CAD models 
of the system, which do not accurately represent the 
components later found to cause this issue. In some 
cases, however, it is clear that even when the CAD model 
included the components, the CAD model was not 
actually checked against the requirements at all. This is 
because the teams assumed that their COTS structure 
would be designed such that there would be space for 
such components on the surface. 
Another reason for this issue, however, comes from the 
assumptions made on the dimensions of components. 
Student teams often lack expertise in the design of 
systems with strict dimensional requirements. They 
overlook the fact that even if they design their system to 
exactly to meet dimensional requirements, 
manufacturing tolerances can stop them from doing so in 
reality. Additionally, it has been observed that product 
assurance issues on the side of COTS suppliers results in 
equipment violating the dimensions shown on 
datasheets, even beyond the tolerances.  
The impact of this problem is generally that the student 
teams need to remanufacture their side panels, internal 
PCBs, or stack spacers, either to reduce the panel 
thickness or to change parts and components. In case 
remanufacturing is not possible, there is a risk that the 
Request for Waiver for the dimensional requirements is 
not accepted by the deployer responsible authority. If the 
teams can select the orbital deployer, this will also limit 
the choice to only those deployers allowing extra 
volume.   
Student teams are encouraged to monitor their CAD 
models closely, design with geometrical tolerances in 
mind, and to perform measurements and inspections on 
procured parts which could contribute to these violations 
and interferences.  
It is also considered beneficial to include margins in the 
design, in terms of the dimensional envelope, in a way 
that in case unforeseen changes are required, the 
boundaries of the design can be pushed without 
necessarily resulting in non-compliances. 
Uneventful Final Assembly & Integration 
The FYS programme has identified some critical steps 
which can be taken to allow for a successful A&I 
activity. Following these steps resulted in the FYS 
CubeSats running into no major anomalies during the 
A&I activities. In addition, almost no deviations in the 
CubeSat dimensional and physical requirements were 
uncovered upon completion of the assembly. Some of 
the actions taken for this seemingly smooth result are: 
• Early inspections and dimensions verification 
with E(Q)M or (P)FM structures and side 
panels attached in flight-like configuration, 
including stowed deployables. This activity 
uncovered deviations to CubeSat standard 
requirements: protruding components, out-of-
spec structures, problems in rail anodization, 
etc. 
• Early checks of the volume available for 
harnessing. 
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• Dimensional verification of each item upon 
arrival from the manufacturer or supplier. 
• Preparation and, most importantly, validation 
of the procedure for CubeSat Assembly & 
Integration. Details of the procedure include the 
order of integration of all components and the 
application of specific processes (thermocouple 
installation, torque application to screws, 
harness routing and fixation, etc.). 
Unclear Distinction between Mission and Full-
Functional Test 
When preparing the test specification for full-functional 
and mission tests6, the distinction between the two was 
not always clear for the teams. In short: 
• Full-Functional test is requirements oriented. It 
is a comprehensive test to demonstrate the 
integrity of all functions of the item under test, 
in all operational modes, redundancy paths, 
including back‐up modes and all foreseen 
transitions. The main objective of this tests is to 
demonstrate the absence of design, 
manufacturing, and integration error. 
• Mission test is mission and operations oriented. 
Its definition is driven by the Concept of 
Operations and the expected mission timeline. 
It serves to validate the operational procedures 
for nominal and contingency modes or 
scenarios.  
Ground Segment permitting, during Mission Test it is 
recommended to operate the satellite from its Mission 
Control Centre in order to validate the full command and 
telemetry encoding/decoding chain.  
Definition of Verification Testing Goes Beyond 
Requirements 
Upon selection to participate in FYS, CubeSat teams 
were instructed to apply a requirements engineering 
methodology to their project lifecycle. In general, the 
flow-down of requirements from mission, to system, and  
to the component level was not always well established. 
Multiple teams had defined only a reduced set of mission 
and system level requirements, while the design had 
matured without performing a flow-down to subsystem 
or lower level requirements. The importance of the 
requirements to later serve as the baseline of the 
verification activities was furthermore underestimated.  
The lack of a comprehensive set of technical 
requirements was recognised by teams when defining the 
testing activities for subsystem and system functional 
verifications. It was often the case that the activities 
captured in the test specifications were going beyond the 
verification of their (sub-)system requirements, like the 
verification of safety functions, event triggers, etc. This 
was aggravated by the fact that the test pass/fail criteria 
did not always cover the additional verifications outside 
requirements. 
The impact of a poor flow of requirements is exacerbated 
if the group of students participating in the design phase 
is different from those working on AIV activities. The 
need for a proper definition and documentation of 
requirements is key to avoid the loss of knowledge, and 
to ensure a systematic verification of the functional and 
operational design. 
Electromagnetic Interferences Encountered During 
System Stack Testing 
Electromagnetic interference (EMI), which can cause 
serious problems in the function of CubeSat projects, is 
often only encountered when the system is first 
assembled into a full stack and tested. Many student 
teams go through extensive FlatSat testing campaigns, 
only to find that when they assemble their CubeSat they 
have EMI issues.  
These problems arise from the close proximity of EMI 
sources (e.g. RF transmission) with EMI victims (e.g. 
microcontroller peripherals), and the effects can be hard 
to predict. Unfortunately, these issues are rarely solvable 
with software patches, and usually require a change in 
the design (e.g. the addition of an RF filter, a change in 
wire routing, change of PCB grounding plane). This 
means that the schedule impact of such issues can be 
severe (in the range of 3 - 5 months); especially 
considering that this occurs after completing the 
assembly of the system stack and at least a partial 
disassembly is required. 
The lesson learned in the FYS programme is that it is 
valuable to assess the electromagnetic compatibility 
(EMC) of the system from an early stage. By 
characterising the expected EMI sources and victims at 
an early stage, the design team can be aware of the 
possible risks they may face during AIV. EMI 
mitigations can be implemented, such as shielding or 
partitioning of high risk components.  
The reality of educational CubeSat projects shows that it 
is often beyond the scope of student teams to fully 
characterise and mitigate EMI issues on their system, 
and they must rely on functional tests at system level as 
a form of EMC testing. Ideally this functional testing 
would be done as soon as possible, such as on an 
engineering qualification model. Merely by being aware 
of the issue and making an attempt to characterise and 
mitigate EMI effects, the student teams will be in a better 
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position in the event that such an issue does occur. Major 
milestones (e.g. Full Functional Test at system level) 
should be accompanied by significant margin in the 
schedule, to account for issues such as this. 
Neglect in GSE Development Leads to Stress During 
AIV Milestones 
Ground support equipment (GSE) required for assembly, 
integration and testing activities is never the star of the 
show, taking background priority over the development 
of the space or ground segments.  
It has been observed at test campaigns taking place at the 
CSF that GSE is often the weak link in many of the test 
setups put together by the teams, resulting in delays to 
test activities and, in extreme cases, making it impossible 
to draw any valuable conclusion from tests due to doubt 
on whether the setup was adequate or not. 
Examples of poor GSE practices and their consequences 
are included below.  
• Using jumper cables and breadboard style 
connections instead of proper connectors and 
harnessing, causing setup unreliability, prone to 
short circuits or open circuits. 
• Not testing the GSE prior to the test activity, 
leading to the need for modifications on the spot 
or parts of the setup not working as intended. A 
dry run is always recommended before any test! 
• Damage to spacecraft subsystems due to 
improper grounding practices. 
• Keeping data stored in memory without 
dumping it to a log file before the test is over 
can cause the loss of test data due to memory 
overflow or computer crash. Always ensure that 
data is recorded in a reliable place. 
• GSE software not tested beforehand can create 
lots of bugs during the test activity and a loss of 
confidence in the test setup. 
• Overreliance on (Kapton) tape, which is prone 
to losing adhesion during thermal vacuum tests, 
can result in damage to the item under test or 
the setup. 
It should be noted that such problems are not due to poor 
design intent on the part of the student teams, but often 
are the result of short preparation timelines and 
inexperience with the specific test setups. In almost all 
cases, the issues that were seen in the first test campaigns 
for each team were learned from and never repeated in 
future tests. 
Mechanical Qualification Levels: Flexibility is Key  
It is a reality that student CubeSat teams often have to 
adapt to changes in the launch opportunity as they are 
never the main customers for the launch. Unexpected 
changes in the launch vehicle or launch configuration 
may result in an under-qualification to the new flight 
levels, as the levels selected in the original AIV approach 
can be lower than the those finally required by the launch 
authorities. 
To mitigate this risk, teams are advised to not try to 
optimise levels early on and instead opt for designing 
their systems towards the strictest possible 
environmental requirements. A good starting point is the 
NASA General Environmental Verification Standard, 
widely acknowledged as a suitable envelope of 
environmental requirements. 
This approach can be challenging to begin with, and may 
be considered by some as over-testing or over-
engineering, but will very likely reduce the need for 
future delta-testing and will lead to a smoother, and 
cheaper, execution of the project’s AIV plan.  
COTS and Subsystem Qualification Status 
One of the benefits of procuring a COTS subsystem or 
unit is that often the environmental qualification of the 
item in question has already been conducted. Teams are 
recommended to request reports of the qualification 
status in which the test specification and the test results 
are captured. While this may seem trivial at the time of 
procurement, this information is key when assessing the 
qualification against the launch environment levels. 
Application of Proper Torque to Fasteners 
The number one cause of vibration test anomalies is the 
lack of properly specified torque values for the fasteners. 
Higher than adequate torque leads to screw heads 
stripping or damage to the item under test, while lower 
than adequate torque leads to screws loosening during 
the test, potentially causing serious damage to the item 
under test. 
“Hand tight” is not a scientific way to measure torque. 
Safety and Reliability Requirements Impact on AIV 
Plan 
Safety requirements can add a considerable overhead to 
the design and, especially, to the verification plan of a 
project. This happens not only in terms of the required 
number of tests to be performed, but also the level of 
detail required to demonstrate compliance to those 
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requirements. This can be translated either in additional 
project time (in-house) and/or in additional cost (both in-
house and COTS). Two examples of this are ISS safety 
certifications, and in-house development of an EPS 
(Electrical Power Subsystem). 
Furthermore, reliability requirements imposed by 
manufacturers can also add constraints to the verification 
plan, so teams are advised to carefully discuss the 
implication of the manufacturer’s reliability 
requirements before purchasing a COTS part or 
subsystem. A clear example of this is with the operation 
of antenna deployment. These mechanisms are 
sometimes sold with only a limited number of 
guaranteed deployments or, in extreme cases, the 
manufacturer requires the antenna to be shipped back to 
their facilities for refurbishment, which causes 
disruption at system level, when the spacecraft should 
remain under configuration control. 
Lack of Access to Test Facilities 
Student CubeSat teams are generally reliant on their 
university facilities and facilities provided by their 
sponsoring partners to perform tests for their project. In 
the FYS programme, the student teams are also given 
limited access to a range of test facilities operated by or 
associated with ESA. 
A challenge that is faced by many CubeSat teams is the 
ability to identify and book test facilities which meet the 
requirements of their mission. A clear example of this is 
in the performance testing of VHF antennas, which are 
commonly used in CubeSat TT&C subsystems. A test 
facility with the capabilities to properly measure the 
performance of a VHF antenna is hard to find, as the 
frequency is relatively low (compared to UHF or S-band, 
the other common CubeSat communication frequencies) 
which means that a large anechoic chamber is required 
to provide acceptable results. A facility with the 
capability to test VHF antennas is unlikely to be 
available on university premises, and the student teams 
need to look elsewhere for this option, often joining long 
waiting lists for a test slot. 
The lesson learned here is that planning for testing in 
Phase D should include a thorough review of test 
facilities available, making sure that their capabilities are 
adequate. Alternative test approaches, like performance 
testing of antennas outdoors using a development model, 
can also be considered. 
Remote Access to Test Setups in the Clean Room 
The ability to operate satellite hardware through a remote 
access connection from outside of the university 
premises was seen as a very valuable capability for teams 
in the FYS programme. During subsystem software 
development, FlatSat testing, and system level testing, 
the ability to interact with the hardware through the 
EGSE and a remote access connection allows student 
CubeSat teams many advantages. In the best case, this 
involves being able to fully operate the satellite while it 
is in the clean room and the students are at home.  
This capability allowed team members to participate in 
hardware testing and development in a spontaneous and 
convenient way. Team members could begin or join 
ongoing work on the hardware without the need for a 
physical presence in the facility. The advantage of this 
was even more apparent during the COVID-19 
pandemic, when access to many university facilities was 
limited. Student teams which were able to set up such a 
remote connection were able to continue making 
progress throughout the many months of restricted 
access to facilities. When only one team member could 
access the facility due to COVID restrictions, they could 
have another team member join remotely to serve in the 
produce assurance role during testing.  
Remote access to the hardware setups also benefits long 
duration tests, such as mission testing, where operations 
on the hardware are occurring outside of normal working 
hours. Student teams were able to easily monitor their 
test results at any hour, without a requirement for 




Many student teams struggle to predict the duration of 
development and AIV activities. This is not an 
uncommon situation in long-term projects with many 
new developments, but in the case of student projects it 
is compounded by their lack of previous experience. This 
schedule slip is even more exaggerated in cases where 
there is not a fixed launch opportunity (in particular a 
launch date) defined for the project. 
Throughout the programme, it was noticed that teams 
were frequently struggling to predict their schedules 
beyond a 2-4 month window into the future, often 
iterating over designs and tests multiple times, 
sometimes with the hope of improving results i.e. not 
accepting ‘good enough’. In addition, major anomalies 
occurring during tests of flight or qualification models 
resulted in delays between one and five months in the 
schedule.  
In the absence of other constraints, especially when there 
is not a launch in sight, the recommendation is to 
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maintain granular schedules in the short-term and high-
level work-packages with generous margins in the long-
term. It is also recommended to keep open 
communications with regards to launch opportunities, 
test facility availability etc.  
Activities Not Predicted Well in Schedules 
While most of the teams prepared a reasonable AIV 
sequence for their system, the following activities turned 
out to be drivers of the schedule in the short term, 
causing overall delays in the schedule:  
• Procurement activities and lead times 
• Software and Firmware development, both in 
the flight and ground segment. 
• Preparation of subsystem environmental testing 
(additional analysis, manufacturing of GSE) 
and subsequent redesigns triggered by 
anomalies. 
• FlatSat configuration was extensively used for 
software debugging and validation, beyond 
what was predicted. 
• The development and validation of AIT tools 
and facilities, such as 
o Test benches: FlatSat motherboards, 
Helmholtz coils, sun simulators, 
optical test benches, etc. 
o Ground Support Equipment (GSE): 
jigs, stands, power supplies, harness, 
hand tools, etc. 
o Cleanroom preparation to host the 
flight hardware  
• Ground Station installation and setup for 
operation. Development of Mission Control 
software. 
• Newcomers’ on-boarding period, exams, and 
holiday slowdown. 
Scheduling of CDR 
The Critical Design Review (CDR) is the first formal 
review within the programme for which the teams 
document in detail the allocation of AIV activities for the 
system, subsystems, and units. The student projects are 
typically constrained by their own funding schemes, 
such that they choose to wait for the CDR to be passed 
before they begin the procurement of hardware. It is 
extremely common for anomalies to be discovered 
during testing once the hardware is eventually procured, 
which results in  changes to the designs presented at the 
CDR. The changes to baselined designs result in delays 
to the project, and the lesson learned is to not push for an 
early CDR until prototypes of critical in-house 
developments have been demonstrated. 
In future editions of the programme, an informal review 
will be organised upon acceptance to the programme to 
review the AIV plans for phase C and D. Teams will be 
encouraged to allocate funding to the development of 
prototypes for testing before the formal CDR starts, with 
the goal of significantly reducing the need for design 
changes after CDR.  
Procurement Considerations 
When planning procurement activities, there are four 
aspects that should be paid special attention to: 
1. Third-party developments: At earlier stages of 
the project, teams may have decided to procure 
a product “in development”. This puts the team 
at the mercy of someone else’s delays, and this 
can result in schedule problems which teams 
have no control over. Developers should 
consider looking for qualified components, and 
flight heritage if possible; there should be a very 
good rationale to rely on third party 
developments.  
2. Good communication with suppliers: Detailed 
information like lead time (from purchase order 
to delivery), option sheets, product 
qualification status / test reports, availability of 
datasheets and extensive user manuals, 
engineering support hours, etc. should be clear 
to the party procuring the product. It should be 
also understood if the documentation can be 
available before receiving the actual item so 
that the customer may familiarise themselves 
with all manuals and datasheets. 
3. Funding administration rules: Universities and 
other public entities follow their own rules and 
approval loops before a purchase order can be 
sent to a supplier. Enrolling the support of 
experienced staff can help developers 
understand the administration cycles and avoid 
foreseeable issues.  
4. Always when receiving an item, teams should 
carry out incoming inspections. As a minimum, 
visual inspection (for soldering quality, 
contamination) and verification of 
conformance to datasheet or purchase order 
(component placement, pinout connectors, 
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dimensions, mass, serial numbers, etc.) should 
be conducted. For more complex systems, 
additional acceptance tests shall be planned to 
verify the functions, electrical configuration, 
interfaces, etc.  
The importance of the incoming inspection procedures 
was confirmed as teams uncovered quality issues in the 
COTS products received, e.g. poor-quality crimps, 
conformal coating application issues, damaged screws, 
incorrect connector size, incorrect machining of thread 
holes, etc..  
Furthermore, teams also make mistakes in their purchase 
orders (incorrect components selected, specific 
instructions missing) and review of the design files/ 
option sheets are needed before the updated part is 
ordered. Conducting incoming inspection procedures 
enables the systematic checking of all arrived products 
and avoids delays. Having a second person review the 
order in the first place could help prevent the issues in 
advance.  
One common practice is to procure three copies of 
inexpensive items: one to release for flight, one for 
testing/qualification and one spare. Once items are 
accepted, the cleaning and storage recommendations 
from the manufacturer shall be followed.  
Loss of Expertise and Continuity due to Graduating 
Students 
The reality of long-term projects run by student teams is 
that students will come and go from the project. This 
happens when students graduate, get internships, or other 
commitments interfere with their ability to contribute. 
The loss of student resources can create immediate and 
long-term problems for the project. In the short-term, it 
can mean that the project has lost expertise on a 
particular subject matter, or that ongoing developments 
are delayed while another student takes over the tasks of 
the departing team member. In the long-term, it might 
mean that there are difficulties re-running analyses 
which were done by departed team members, for 
example if there is a design update which changes the 
assumptions made in the initial analysis. 
One of the leading causes of this issue is that optimistic 
project schedules may imply that the student will have 
enough time to complete and document their work before 
their planned departure from the team. If this schedule 
eventually is not met, a proper handover of 
responsibilities and expertise may not be completed to 
the standard that the team would hope for.  
This problem is nearly unavoidable in educational 
CubeSat projects, but the impact of it can be mitigated. 
The important lesson learned here is that the project 
manager must make an active effort to manage the 
student resources and transfer of knowledge. There are 
many ways to approach this task.  
An effort must be made to compare the project schedules 
with the academic plans of the students. It is valuable to 
anticipate the departure of students and be ready to 
recruit more students when needed. It is also common for 
teams to hire/provide a research grant for graduating 
students on a temporary basis so that they can complete 
a critical task. 
One simple way to promote transfer of knowledge is to 
ensure that students are working in groups and 
communicating with each other. Ideally this involves 
overlapping the tasks of incoming students with 
experienced/departing students to allow for direct 
knowledge transfer. If students are working in isolation, 
it is inevitable that when they depart the team there will 
be a loss of expertise. 
In parallel to the management of student resources, the 
CubeSat team should encourage the creation of 
documentation which can be used to trace what was done 
by past team members. This involves documenting more 
than just results from tests/analysis, but also established 
procedures, thought processes, research references, and 
meeting minutes. 
Mission Authorisation Challenges 
CubeSats, like all spacecraft, must obtain mission 
authorisation from their national government before they 
can be approved for a launch. The challenges associated 
with this process vary significantly depending on the 
national legislation.  
Project managers for CubeSat teams should get as much 
information as possible on the applicable space laws for 
their mission to obtain the required mission authorisation 
within a reasonable time frame. Contact should be 
established with the relevant authorities as early as 
possible and maintained throughout the project lifetime. 
Frequency Allocation and Coordination  
Upon acceptance to the programme, teams are reminded 
of the importance of starting the international and 
national frequency allocation and coordination.  Because 
of the risk of conflicts or coordination problems, and the 
risk that the relevant authorities may ask operators to 
apply changes to the radio system which may also result 
in additional costs, teams are encouraged to fulfil these 
obligations as early as possible. 
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PRODUCT ASSURANCE  
Importance of Root Cause Analysis and Data 
Gathering During Development Model Testing 
Anomalies that appear during development testing are 
prone to being discarded as part of the normal trial and 
error process that occurs during development, without 
any further investigation into the root cause of the issue.  
This effect is to be (partially) expected in student teams, 
due to the lack of resources that prevent following up on 
every single issue. However, when the lack of 
documentation and root cause analysis surrounding early 
issues becomes systematic, it is more challenging to fix 
issues which resurface at a time when the teams are 
under strict timeline pressure.  
When it is not possible to chase down every issue, due to 
lack of resources or time, it can be of great help to at least 
record as much data as possible about the early issues in 
a structured way, including the test parameters, 
observations, and pictures if relevant. The existence of 
such a database of early issues will contribute to a more 
effective prioritisation within the team of what issues 
should be analysed in detail, since it will make it easier 
for a team to know which issues have surfaced more than 
once and thus may warrant a careful look. 
In the absence of an independent quality assurance 
responsible (typical in student projects), anomalies and 
adverse effects are often only superficially analysed, as 
students have sometimes not yet recognised the necessity 
of carrying out these tasks. At the occurrence of an 
anomaly, comprehensive root-cause analyses should be 
conducted, as problems might be hidden behind an initial 
high-level assessment which appears positive. The 
recommendation is to train oneself in observing 
anomalies, and to make design choices with a critical 
attitude. 
Configuration control 
From the experience of the FYS project team, the 
concept of configuration control is not fully understood, 
or not at all known, by university students’ projects. It 
can be seen that teams sometimes have difficulties 
accepting “good enough” and thus continuing to iterate 
and optimise a concept, or the definition of a design, 
whenever there is the opportunity to do so. While this 
tendency may appear to be beneficial at first glance, the 
consequences of a never-ending design process is that 
configuration control becomes extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to properly achieve. When the design meets 
requirements, then it is “good enough”, and further 
changes should be well justified. 
Good practice for configuration control is that all updates 
to a deliverable item (hardware, software, but also a 
report, a technical document, a plan, a technical 
requirement, etc.) are tracked and each updated version 
is assigned a configuration identifier. It is instead often 
the case that university students need to be reminded of 
the need to account for any change occurred in a baseline 
configuration since a previous issue of a certain 
deliverable. “Change to a baseline configuration” does 
not necessarily refer only to hardware changes, but also 
to variation from a previously defined operational 
concept, update of numerical models based on test result, 
a software function being updated, or change of plan 
(e.g., a test activity initially foreseen is not carried out 
anymore, or vice-versa).  
Aside from maintaining a record of changes, 
configuration-controlled documentation helps 
newcomers get acquainted with the current status of the 
project. 
The most problematic consequence of any change in the 
configuration baseline is the fact that any verification 
activity conducted until that point in time may be 
impacted or invalidated by the changes. This may in turn 
trigger delta verification activities. The experience in the 
FYS programme shows that students are tempted to 
hastily implement design change without fully 
considering the consequences, resulting in considerable 
headaches to solve in often already tight schedules. 
Furthermore, rushed changes may generate anomalies in 
other disciplines. 
To conclude, it is recommend to never underestimate the 
value of having a “reviewed and approved” 
configuration baseline, achieved for example via a 
Critical Design Review process, and to always assess the 
consequence of applying a configuration change. 
Cleanliness and Contamination Control 
Not all the universities have the resources to enable 
hardware work within a certified cleanroom (e.g. ISO8). 
This may be a source of issues when the time to discuss 
a launch opportunity comes, as the main payload or the 
launch authority may impose strict cleanliness 
requirements on the CubeSat. 
Wherever a cleanroom is not available, alternative 
solutions should be sought, such as portable cleanrooms, 
laminar flow test benches or restricted-access rooms 
with specific cleanliness provisions. The above shall be 
coupled with cleanliness and contamination control 
practices and cleaning prior to delivery. Tools that may 
be useful to conduct cleanliness inspections are a UV 
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flashlight (to detect molecular contamination) and a 
white flashlight (to detect particulate contamination). To 
remove contamination, CubeSat developers may start 
with a single-hair brush to remove particulate 
contamination and wiping with appropriate chemicals 
for molecular contamination. 
It is also recommended to keep systematic records of the 
cleanliness status of the hardware, including pictures 
prior to the assembly of units.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The FYS programme has collected in this paper some of 
the common issues FYS 2 teams faced, as well as 
suggesting approaches that any student team reading can 
follow to try to reduce the risks in their approach to 
CubeSat project development.  
It is worth highlighting the fact that many of the lessons 
learned collected here are not only related to technical 
aspects but also to programmatic, managerial, and legal 
issues.  
While a prospective CubeSat project team may at first be 
focused on the engineering challenge, it is essential for 
the project’s success that a solid project management 
structure is eventually put into place, as many of the 
hardest obstacles to traverse will come in the form of 
problems with procurement, student turnover, 
documentation, legal, safety, and launch requirements.   
The lessons identified here will feed back into the 
improvement of future Fly Your Satellite! cycles, from 
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